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________________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Barbara Boyer, the widow of a cancer researcher who 
developed a fatal tumor allegedly as a result of inadequate 
safety precautions taken to protect him from radiation in his 
lab, sued the University of Pennsylvania together with 
affiliated persons and entities.1 Before us is the reach of the 
Price-Anderson Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq., and its 
remedy-limiting provisions. The Act gives federal courts 
jurisdiction to resolve a broad set of claims involving liability 
for physical harm arising from nuclear radiation. Boyer 
asserts, however, that the Act’s unexpressed intent would 
exempt her husband’s injuries from its jurisdictional grant. 
 Her claims fall within the text of the Act, so if we are 
to limit it to a zone of interests narrower than its text 
provides, Boyer must offer a compelling limiting principle 
that would put her allegations beyond the Act’s reach. 
Although she suggests several implicit limitations, each is 
                                              
1 The defendants in this action are the University of 
Pennsylvania; the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania; 
the Perelman School of Medicine; the Trustees of the 
University of Pennsylvania; and Drs. Ann Kennedy, Gary 
Kao, and Michelle Alonso-Basanta. We refer to them jointly 
as the “UPenn defendants”; “UPenn” refers, depending on 
context, to the University of Pennsylvania or all the 
defendants. 
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either unconvincing or, even if adopted, would leave this case 
still within the Act’s reach. Thus we must affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Jeffrey H. Ware, Ph.D., was a neuroscientist at the 
University of Pennsylvania who studied the effects of 
radiation on biological organisms with the goal of better 
understanding how radiation affects astronauts while in orbit. 
In the course of his research Ware used cesium-137 
irradiators to track the effects of low-level radiation on mice 
and rats. 
 Tragically, Ware suffered in 2010 a rare form of brain 
cancer called gliosarcoma. Boyer claims gliosarcoma is 
associated with radiation exposure (however, because she 
produced no expert reports, there is nothing in the record to 
support this link). She also alleges that Ware’s cancer 
specifically resulted from radiation exposure that UPenn 
failed to monitor properly or protect against. Moreover, 
UPenn failed to inform Ware of the level of radiation to 
which he was exposed. 
 Following his diagnosis, Ware turned to the 
University’s affiliated hospital for medical care. He 
underwent chemotherapy and radiation in order to slow the 
cancer’s progression. Boyer alleges that Ware was not given 
appropriate information about these treatments; that, given 
the advanced stage of his disease, they provided little benefit; 
and that, at one appointment where she was not present, a 
UPenn doctor enrolled Ware in a research study to investigate 
the effects of chemotherapy and radiation on brain cancer 
patients without his knowing consent. According to Boyer, 
UPenn concealed and withheld documents and data related to 
the study to “cover up its terrible record of radiation safety 
and to protect millions of research dollars.” Boyer’s Br. at 9. 
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UPenn also discouraged Ware from seeking palliative care, 
she claims, in order to maintain his participation in the study. 
 Just a year after his diagnosis, Ware died from his 
cancer at age 47. Boyer filed a complaint in the Pennsylvania 
Court of Common Pleas as administratrix of Ware’s estate as 
well as on behalf of herself and Ware’s surviving children. 
Her initial complaint alleged numerous counts, including 
negligence, fraud, retaliation, and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. She added to the UPenn defendants the 
National Space Biomedical Research Institute (“NSBRI”), a 
research organization started by NASA that funded Ware’s 
work. 
 UPenn and the NSBRI removed the case to federal 
court on the grounds that (1) claims against UPenn are 
covered by the Price-Anderson Act, which provides federal 
jurisdiction over claims asserting “public liability” arising 
from a “nuclear incident,” see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(q), (w), 
(hh), & 2210(n); and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) permits removal 
of claims against NSBRI because it is a federal agency. 
 Following Boyer’s unsuccessful motion to remand, the 
District Court adopted a Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation that the Price-Anderson Act applies to 
Boyer’s claims alleging that Ware was harmed by radiation 
from cesium-137 used in his lab and that the NSBRI is a 
federal agency. Boyer responded by dismissing all claims 
against the NSBRI and amending her complaint to include 
two counts of “negligence under the Price-Anderson Act” 
(the “Price-Anderson claims”) and additional counts styled as 
state-law claims for fraud, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, malpractice, and “corporate negligence.” J.A. 476-
488. 
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 Discovery began, and UPenn produced five expert 
reports and thousands of pages of documents. Boyer failed to 
produce a single expert report to substantiate her claims. 
UPenn filed four motions that the District Court construed as 
motions for summary judgment, to which Boyer never 
responded. 
 Per regulations issued by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (“NRC”), entities holding licenses to handle 
certain nuclear materials must limit the dose of radiation 
received by employees from occupational exposure to five 
rem (5,000 millirem) per year. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1201 
(“Occupational dose limits for adults”). It is uncontested that 
Ware’s total occupational radiation exposure over 16 years 
was only 0.075 rem (75 millirem), which would yield an 
annual average of only 0.0047 rem (4.7 millirem).2 Because 
this amount is far below the five-rem standard set in 
§ 20.1201, Boyer concluded that she could not prevail on any 
claims governed by the Price-Anderson Act, so she moved to 
withdraw her Price-Anderson claims and to remand the 
remainder of her claims to state court. 
 The District Court denied the motion to withdraw, and, 
because Boyer had failed to produce any expert reports or 
even oppose UPenn’s motions for summary judgment, it 
granted summary judgment to UPenn on all of her claims. 
Boyer appeals, challenging the District Court’s determination 
that the Price-Anderson Act applies to her negligence claims 
as well as the Court’s denial of her motion to withdraw while 
retaining jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claims. 
                                              
2 Boyer alleges that Ware was not, but should have been, 
provided with a dosimeter badge at all times to monitor his 
individual radiation exposure. However, she does not dispute 
the 0.075 rem total exposure calculation. 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We review de novo the District Court’s interpretation 
of the Price-Anderson Act and exercise the same review over 
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See Fair Hous. 
Rights Ctr. in Se. Pennsylvania v. Post Goldtex GP, LLC, 823 
F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2016); Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur, 
Inc., 819 F.3d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2016). Our review of the 
District Court’s denial of Boyer’s request for voluntary 
dismissal is for abuse of discretion. Ferguson v. Eakle, 492 
F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1974). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 A. The Price-Anderson Act Governs Boyer’s  
  Negligence Claims. 
 The District Court held the Price-Anderson Act applies 
to Boyer’s claims asserting that Ware was harmed by 
radiation emitted from cesium-137 irradiators used in his lab. 
The Act provides for removal to federal court of any “public 
liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear 
incident.” 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n). As noted, Boyer and UPenn 
agree that, if the Act applies, Boyer can only state a claim for 
relief if Ware received more than five rem of radiation per 
year.3 It is undisputed that Ware’s average annual radiation 
                                              
3 The NRC regulations the parties cite merely set out rules 
binding entities with licenses to hold certain nuclear 
materials. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1201. Neither party offers any 
legal source that would limit liability under the Price-
Anderson Act to cases where exposure exceeds § 20.1201’s 
limits. But because Boyer accepts this limitation as true and 
failed to oppose summary judgment, we have no occasion to 
challenge it. 
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exposure was much less than five rem, so any claim to which 
the Act applies is not viable. 
 But that is not the worst of Boyer’s situation: if the 
Price-Anderson Act applies, even her claims that don’t stem 
from Ware’s radiation exposure are lost as well. Boyer failed 
to oppose summary judgment on any of her claims (even 
those, like medical malpractice, that the parties agree are not 
governed by the Act). Thus, on appeal Boyer attempts to save 
her claims by contending that the District Court either lacked 
jurisdiction over her claims or abused its discretion by 
exercising it. 
 For these reasons, Boyer contends the Price-Anderson 
Act, which grew out of the federal Government’s initial 
efforts to regulate nuclear weapons and power plants in the 
1940s and ’50s, does not apply to laboratory research. Her 
interpretation of the Act conflicts with its text, and she 
identifies no principle that would both rule out its application 
to Ware’s research and be true to the Act’s purpose and 
structure. 
  1. The Price-Anderson Act 
   a. History 
 “With the object of encouraging the private sector to 
become involved in the development of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954[], 68 Stat. 919, a broad scheme of federal regulation 
and licensing.” El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 
473, 476 (1999) (internal brackets, quotation marks, and 
citation omitted). “[I]n 1957 Congress amended the [Atomic 
Energy Act] with the Price-Anderson Act, 71 Stat. 576[, 
which] provided certain federal licensees with a system of 
private insurance, Government indemnification, and limited 
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liability for claims of ‘public liability,’ now defined generally 
as ‘any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear 
incident or precautionary evacuation[.]” Id. (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 2014(w)). 
 Congress has continued to build on the Price-Anderson 
Act’s foundation, expanding its scope and functions. The Act 
initially relied on state courts and state law to rule on and 
govern liability for nuclear accidents. In re TMI Litig. Cases 
Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 852 (3d Cir. 1991). However, 
amendments in 1966 “provided for the transfer, to a federal 
district court, of all claims arising out of an extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence”4 and brought about greater uniformity of 
liability determinations while retaining state-law causes of 
action. Id. The amendments require indemnified entities “to 
waive the defenses of negligence, contributory negligence, 
charitable or governmental immunity, and assumption of the 
                                              
4 An “extraordinary nuclear occurrence” is 
any event causing a discharge or dispersal of 
source, special nuclear, or byproduct material 
from its intended place of confinement in 
amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels 
offsite, which the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission or the Secretary of Energy, as 
appropriate, determines to be substantial, and 
which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or 
the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, 
determines has resulted or will probably result 
in substantial damages to persons offsite or 
property offsite . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2014(j). 
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risk in the event of an action arising as the result of an 
extraordinary nuclear occurrence.” Id. 
 “In the wake of the 1979 accident at the Three Mile 
Island nuclear power plant, suits proliferated in state and 
federal courts, but because the accident was not an 
‘extraordinary nuclear occurrence,’ within the meaning of the 
Act, see § 2014(j), there was no mechanism for consolidating 
the claims in federal court.” El Paso Nat. Gas, 526 U.S. at 
477. So Congress acted again in 1988, providing for federal 
jurisdiction over any actions “asserting public liability” 
arising from a “nuclear incident,” which generally includes 
any “occurrence” causing physical harm resulting from the 
radioactive properties of nuclear material. See id. The 1988 
amendments also took another step toward federalizing the 
law applicable to nuclear accidents by providing that “any 
suit asserting public liability . . . shall be deemed to be an 
action arising under [the Price-Anderson Act]” rather than 
state law. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). 
 These 1988 amendments, which are at the heart of this 
case, deliberately increased the scope of the Act’s coverage. 
See Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“‘Nuclear incident’ is not limited to a single, 
catastrophic accident: indeed, one purpose behind the 1988 
amendments was to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction 
beyond actions arising from ‘extraordinary nuclear 
occurrences’ only.” (citing Kerr–McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 
F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th Cir. 1997))). They provide federal 
jurisdiction in a wider variety of situations than the prior 
version of the law. See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 
618 F.3d 1127, 1133, 1140–42 (10th Cir. 2010) (claims of 
property owners at risk of nuclear material blowing onto their 
properties from nuclear weapons plant turned wildlife 
refuge); Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 
567, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (claims of workers exposed to 
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cesium-137 carelessly left on oil drilling rig); Acuna, 200 
F.3d at 338 (claims of workers, their family members, and 
nearby residents for harm from uranium mine). 
 Although the history of the Act’s amendments tracks 
major events in the development of nuclear power and 
weapons, the Act’s concerns are not so narrow. As noted 
above, Congress has “encourag[ed] the private sector to 
become involved in the development of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes[.]” El Paso Nat. Gas, 526 U.S. at 476. 
Among the purposes pointed to by Congress at the outset of 
its plan for regulating atomic energy are “providing for . . . a 
program of conducting, assisting, and fostering research and 
development in order to encourage maximum scientific and 
industrial progress[,] . . . for the dissemination of unclassified 
scientific and technical information[,] and for the control, 
dissemination, and declassification of Restricted Data, subject 
to appropriate safeguards, so as to encourage scientific and 
industrial progress[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2013. Highlighting the 
Act’s scientific aims, § 2210(k) specifically sets certain 
financial requirements that apply to non-profit educational 
institutions. 
   b. Key Provisions 
 Today the Price-Anderson Act provides for the 
removal to federal court of any “public liability action arising 
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2210(n). As the District Court commented, this “would 
seem to be a peculiar way to describe a case alleging that a 
researcher was injured while working on the campus of the 
University of Pennsylvania,” Ware v. Hosp. of the Univ. of 
Pennsylvania, No. 2:14-CV-00014, 2016 WL 4702117, at *2 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016), but any peculiarity simply derives 
from Congress’ slow expansion of the Act’s statutory 
definitions to bring a growing set of matters within its scope. 
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 In essence, the Act provides federal jurisdiction over 
claims asserting legal liability for “any occurrence” causing 
physical harm or property damage resulting from the 
radioactive properties of nuclear material. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2014(q), (w), (hh) & 2210(n)(2). However, because its 
definitions are complicated, interlocking, and use words in 
unintuitive ways, it is worth pausing to consider the Act’s key 
provisions. 
 Section 2210(n)(2) contains the jurisdictional grant: 
With respect to any public liability action 
arising out of or resulting from a nuclear 
incident, the United States district court in the 
district where the nuclear incident takes place 
. . . shall have original jurisdiction without 
regard to the citizenship of any party or the 
amount in controversy. 
 That grant, in turn, depends on the definitions of 
“public liability action” and “nuclear incident.” A “public 
liability action” is simply “any suit asserting public liability.” 
Id. § 2014(hh).5 And “public liability” means (apart from 
                                              
5 Under the Price-Anderson Act “the substantive rules for 
decision in [a public liability] action shall be derived from the 
law of the State in which the nuclear incident involved 
occurs, unless such law is inconsistent with the provisions of 
[the Act].” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). That is, although (1) the 
case proceeds in federal court, (2) the cause of action is itself 
federal, and (3) certain state-law defenses may not be raised, 
see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(hh) & 2210(n)(1), state law 
nonetheless will provide the elements of any public liability 
action except to the extent that a provision of the Act requires 
something different. 
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certain exceptions not relevant here) “any legal liability 
arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or 
precautionary evacuation.” Id. § 2014(w). That brings us to 
“nuclear incident”: 
The term “nuclear incident” means any 
occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear 
occurrence, . . . causing . . . bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage 
to property, or loss of use of property, arising 
out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, 
explosive, or other hazardous properties of 
source, special nuclear, or byproduct material[.] 
Id. § 2014(q). 
 This definition of “nuclear incident” is facially quite 
broad, and, because the definitions above all rely on it, the 
Price-Anderson Act’s jurisdictional grant is also broad. 
  2. Boyer’s Price-Anderson Claims 
 Despite these expansive definitions, Boyer contends 
the District Court erred when it held that the Price-Anderson 
Act applied to all of her claims alleging that Ware was 
harmed by radiation from cesium-137 used in his lab. We 
disagree. 
 The Act’s text maps neatly onto Boyer’s allegations. 
There is no dispute that cesium-137 is a “byproduct 
material,”6 and, according to Boyer, its radioactive properties 
                                              
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (defining “byproduct material”); 
Dumontier, 543 F.3d at 569 (applying § 2014(q) to injuries 
caused by cesium-137).  
14 
 
caused Ware’s “bodily injury, sickness, disease, [and 
ultimately] death.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q). As long as we give 
the word “occurrence” its ordinary meaning—“something 
that takes place; esp. something that happens unexpectedly 
and without design; or the action or process of happening or 
taking place,” Carey v. Kerr–McGee Chem. Corp., 60 F. 
Supp. 2d 800, 805 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (quoting Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary (1993))—the facts alleged 
constitute a “nuclear incident” under § 2014(q). 
 Boyer claims UPenn bears legal liability arising from 
this nuclear incident, so what she alleges is “public liability” 
under § 2014(w). Any suit asserting public liability is a 
“public liability action . . . arising under section 2210” of the 
Price-Anderson Act. Id. § 2014(hh). Accordingly, per 
§ 2210(n)(2) the District Court had jurisdiction over Boyer’s 
claims, and UPenn had the right to remove them to federal 
court.  
 Boyer nonetheless raises arguments why the Act does 
not apply. There may exist some limiting principle that would 
effectively cabin the sweeping language Congress used to 
describe any nuclear incident subject to the Act, but none is 
persuasive here.  
 As noted, the Price-Anderson Act’s history largely 
tracks major events in the development of the nuclear power 
and energy industries. Thus Boyer’s first argument is that its 
jurisdictional grant applies only to nuclear accidents involving 
nuclear power plants or weapons facilities. For support, she 
looks to cases, agency fact-sheets, and academic publications 
summarizing the Act’s applicability. E.g., In re TMI II, 940 
F.2d at 855 (“[T]here can be no action for injuries caused by 
the release of radiation from federally licensed nuclear power 
plants separate and apart from the federal public liability 
action created by the [Price-Anderson] Act [amendments of 
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1988].”); See Acuna, 200 F.3d at 339 (“The Price Anderson 
Act sets up an indemnification and limitation of liability 
scheme for public liability arising out of the conduct of the 
nuclear energy and weapons industries.”); United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Insurance and 
Disaster Relief, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/fact-sheets/nuclear-insurance.pdf (December 
2014) (“The Price-Anderson Act . . . cover[s] liability claims 
of members of the public for personal injury and property 
damage caused by a nuclear accident involving a commercial 
nuclear power plant.”); Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson 
Act: Model Compensation Legislation?–the Sixty-Three 
Million Dollar Question, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1989) 
(“The Price-Anderson Act[’s] . . . coverage for NRC licensees 
encompasses activities of commercial nuclear power plants, 
certain fuel fabrication facilities, and non-[Department of 
Energy] reactors used for educational and research 
purposes.”). 
 Boyer contends these descriptions limit the Act’s 
application regardless of what is in its text. But the summaries 
she cites do not purport to explore its scope. They merely 
give the reader a rough sense of the Act’s general purpose. In 
re TMI II, for example, addresses “federally licensed nuclear 
power plants” because that’s what the case was about. 940 
F.2d at 835.7 No one would take a court’s statement that 
                                              
7 True, one District Court has cited the Fifth Circuit’s Acuna 
decision for the proposition that “the [Price-Anderson Act] 
only applies to the nuclear energy and weapons industries.” 
Samples v. Conoco, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1321 (N.D. 
Fla. 2001) (emphasis in original) (calling a plain text reading 
of the statute “Hogwash!”). But a close reading suggests 
Samples’ real concern was the defendants’ attempt to use the 
Act’s tail to wag the dog. They sought to apply the Act to the 
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“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides a cause of action 
to employees fired because of their race” to mean Title VII 
provides no cause of action to individuals suffering 
discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin. 
 What is more, the Price-Anderson Act plainly applies 
in at least some contexts to research universities, as it has 
provisions that cover specifically institutions like the 
University of Pennsylvania. Section 2210(k) provides that 
“nonprofit educational institution[s]” conducting “educational 
activities” pursuant “to any license issued” under the federal 
atomic energy scheme shall be indemnified by the NRC for 
“public liability in excess of $250,000 arising from nuclear 
incidents.” 42 U.S.C. § 2210(k)(1). “[C]ontracts of 
indemnification [entered into by the institution and the 
                                                                                                     
plaintiffs’ action because uranium was listed among “the 
[many] hazardous substances found in the sludge ponds” at a 
chemical waste site. Id. at 1320 n.16. The Court evidently 
found this connection farfetched and gave the Price-Anderson 
argument short shrift. 
   Moreover, Samples later suggests that a defendant’s 
possession of a license to handle nuclear materials would 
trigger the Act’s reach. Id. at 1321 (“The Defendants have 
failed to provide the Court with proof demonstrating they are 
a [Department of Energy] contractor or an NRC licensee. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit does not state a cause of action 
under the [Price-Anderson Act.]”). As we discuss below, 
UPenn had such a license. Thus, depending on how one reads 
Samples—i.e., (1) the Act applies only to the nuclear power 
and weapons industries or (2) the Act applies only to the 
holders of licenses to possess nuclear materials—even that 
Court could have held UPenn to be covered by the Act. 
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Commission] shall cover public liability arising out of or in 
connection with the licensed activity[.]” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2210(k)(2). This section also exempts these licensed 
institutions from certain “financial protection” requirements 
under the Act. Id. It would make no sense for the Act to 
contain these provisions if it did not apply outside the 
weapons and energy industries. That is, Congress’ choice to 
include a provision indemnifying licensed nonprofit 
educational institutions from public liability suggests strongly 
(perhaps overwhelmingly) that the Act applies to them.8 
 Boyer next argues, following the reasoning of a 
District Court in our Circuit, that even if the Price-Anderson 
Act applies to a broad set of industries, it only covers 
defendants that have indemnity agreements with the NRC. 
See Gilberg v. Stepan Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 325, 339 (D.N.J. 
1998), supplemented, 24 F. Supp. 2d 355 (D.N.J. 1998). 
                                              
8 In the alternative, Boyer claims that, even if the Price-
Anderson Act applies to university research labs, it applies 
only to labs that operate nuclear reactors. She cites no portion 
of the Act in favor of this position. The most she does is point 
to regulations dealing with indemnity agreements required for 
institutions that do use reactors. See 10 C.F.R. § 140.72. But 
the existence of regulations specifying requirements for 
institutions with reactors does not imply that those without 
them are somehow exempt from the Act entirely. She goes on 
to cite the NRC’s list of institutions with nuclear reactors in 
Pennsylvania and notes the University’s absence. See United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/region-
state/pennsylvania.html. Its presence on the reactor list is 
relevant only if having a reactor is a prerequisite to the Act’s 
coverage, and we see no reason to hold that it is. 
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Noting § 2014(q)’s broad definition of “nuclear incident,” the 
Gilberg Court looked for a limit to its reach in the nearby 
definition of “extraordinary nuclear occurrence.” Id. (Recall 
that extraordinary nuclear occurrences were the only events 
that triggered federal jurisdiction before the 1988 Price-
Anderson Act amendments.) Following a long and 
complicated analysis of the Act’s history and structure, 
Gilberg concluded that a nuclear incident may only occur 
(and the Act applies) when harm happens at a site covered by 
an indemnification agreement with the NRC. Id. The 
University of Pennsylvania has no such agreement, Audio 
Recording of Oral Argument held June 28, 2017 at 31:23 to 
31:40 (http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/16-
3801EstateofJeffreyHWarevHospitaloftheUnivesityofPennsyl
vaniaetal.mp3); so, the argument goes, its negligence toward 
Ware did not cause a nuclear incident. 
 We are unpersuaded that an indemnification agreement 
is necessary to trigger the Act’s applicability. What Gilberg 
misses is that “one purpose behind the 1988 amendments was 
to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction beyond actions 
arising from ‘extraordinary nuclear occurrences[.]’” Acuna, 
200 F.3d at 339 (citing Kerr–McGee, 115 F.3d at 1502). 
Indeed, that is why the definition of “nuclear incident” is so 
broad. Id. Thus we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion 
that Gilberg’s “attempts to reintroduce the limitations of 
‘extraordinary nuclear occurrence’ into the 1988 
amendments’ substitution of ‘nuclear incident’ rely on faulty 
statutory interpretation and are contrary to Congressional 
intent.” Id. (citing Carey, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 803–07). 
 The remaining arguments suffer from the same flaw. 
Even if we were to accept the limiting principles Boyer 
proposes, her claims would still be governed by the Act. For 
this reason, we have no need to pass on whether the Act is 
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limited in the remaining ways Boyer suggests. We note only 
that, even so, the outcome here would be no different. 
 Boyer argues that the Act applies only when a 
defendant has a license to possess nuclear materials. Indeed, 
§ 2210(k)’s reference to “any license issued” under the 
federal scheme for atomic energy could be read to suggest 
that universities are covered by Price-Anderson only when 
they hold a license to use the materials involved in any 
nuclear incident. One District Court has held that, regardless 
of the type of institution in question, the Act applies 
exclusively to entities holding licenses. Irwin v. CSX Transp., 
Inc., No. 3:10-CV-300, 2011 WL 976376, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. 
Mar. 16, 2011). And the unpersuasive Samples opinion 
mentioned above in footnote 7 gives a nod to that view as 
well, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (“the word occurrence as used 
in the definition of nuclear incident means that event at the 
site of the licensed activity, or activity for which the 
Commission has entered into a contract, which may cause 
damage” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original)). For this reason too, Boyer asserts, 
UPenn is not covered by the Act. 
 But the University of Pennsylvania has such a license. 
Its license to engage in research using cesium-137 irradiators 
was issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection Bureau of Radiation Protection, which exercises 
delegated authority from the NRC per § 274 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2021. Boyer says that’s not 
good enough; the license must be issued by the NRC directly. 
Her argument, however, is hard to follow. 
 The Price-Anderson Act is part of the Atomic Energy 
Act. The latter gives the NRC authority to enter into 
agreements with states allowing them to issue licenses in the 
NRC’s stead. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021. In her Reply, Boyer 
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seems to argue that, because UPenn has a state-issued license, 
only state nuclear regulations apply to its and its affiliates’ 
conduct, and thus the Price-Anderson Act does not apply to 
her suit. But Boyer never says why this would be true. 
Indeed, our sister Circuit has held that “[t]here is nothing in 
the definition of ‘nuclear incident’ which suggests [the Act’s 
application] should be contingent on whether the occurrence 
took place in a state which regulates its own [nuclear 
material] industry under NRC guidelines” or leaves that 
regulation to the NRC directly. Acuna, 200 F.3d at 339. We 
thus reject the argument that UPenn’s state-issued license is 
meaningfully different in this context from a license issued 
directly by the NRC. As a result, even if Boyer is correct that 
possession of a license is the lynchpin for Price-Anderson’s 
applicability, UPenn’s license would satisfy that requirement 
here.9 
 Next up is Boyer’s claim that the Act applies only to 
unintentional releases of nuclear energy. For support, she 
looks to one District Court that declined to apply the Act to 
claims of cancer patients intentionally subjected to radiation 
because “all of the cases applying the Price–Anderson Act 
have extended potential liability only to the unintended 
escape or release of nuclear energy.” In re Cincinnati 
Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 832 (S.D. Ohio 1995) 
(emphasis added). Boyer contends her claims similarly do not 
implicate an unintentional release of nuclear energy. But 
that’s not true. Her complaint alleges that Ware was harmed 
by UPenn’s neglect of its duty to protect him adequately from 
                                              
9 We do not hold that possession of a license determines the 
Act’s applicability. Rather, we note only that, if having a 
license matters in this context, it makes no difference whether 
the license was issued by the NRC directly or by a state 
acting under delegated authority. 
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radiation—that is, negligence, not deliberate exposure. So 
even if this exception to the Act exists, it wouldn’t apply to 
this case. 
 Finally, the Cincinnati Radiation Court also noted that, 
during the legislative process leading to the 1988 
amendments, Congress considered explicitly expanding the 
Act’s reach to cover “persons operating nuclear pharmacies 
or hospital medicine department[s,]” but declined to enact the 
expansion. Id. at 832 n.33 (citing S. Rep. No. 100–218, at 18 
(1988), reprinted as 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1476, 1493). So, 
Boyer argues, we should hold Congress’ failure to adopt this 
language implies a limit on the Act’s application to harm 
from radiation used for medical care.  
 But even if we were to read so much into Congress’ 
inaction, it wouldn’t help Boyer. The cesium-137 irradiators 
that allegedly harmed Ware were not used for patient care or 
any medical purpose nor were they kept in a nuclear 
pharmacy. They were used for research only and kept in a lab. 
The language Congress declined to enact simply has nothing 
to do with the facts of this case. 
 None of this is to say that the Act applies to all harm 
occurring from nuclear material in any situation whatsoever. 
Counsel for UPenn conceded at oral argument that any 
nuclear incident must, at the very least, involve “source, 
special nuclear, or byproduct material[.]” See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2014(q). According to counsel, that limitation would 
exempt harm arising from, among other things, x-rays, CAT 
scans, and naturally occurring uranium and radium. Audio 
Recording of Oral Argument held June 28, 2017 at 32:30 to 
33:18 (http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/16-
3801EstateofJeffreyHWarevHospitaloftheUnivesityofPennsyl
vaniaetal.mp3). Moreover, as mentioned, we do not decide 
whether the possession of a license, the intent of any nuclear 
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energy release, or the medical use of nuclear material, might 
affect the Act’s applicability to a particular case. We note 
only that these implicit limitations on the Price-Anderson 
Act’s scope would not preclude its application here. 
* * * * * 
 In sum, Boyer’s claims alleging that Ware’s cancer 
developed because UPenn negligently exposed him to 
cesium-137 are covered by the Price-Anderson Act. The 
claims allege a “nuclear incident” in that they describe an 
“occurrence . . . causing . . . bodily injury, sickness, disease, 
or death . . . arising out of or resulting from the radioactive 
. . . properties of . . . byproduct material[.]” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2014(q). Boyer contends UPenn is liable for the harm 
arising from this nuclear incident, so her action is a “public 
liability action” subject to federal court jurisdiction. Id. 
§§ 2014(w), (hh) & 2210(n)(2). We know no compelling 
limiting principle that would bar this straightforward 
application of the Act’s text to her case, so we affirm the 
District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
B. The District Court Did Not Err When It 
Declined to Permit Voluntary Dismissal of 
the Price-Anderson Claims and Retained 
Jurisdiction over Boyer’s Remaining Claims. 
 When Boyer failed to convince the District Court that 
the Price-Anderson Act did not apply to her negligence 
claims (and later discovered that she would be unable to make 
the showing necessary to prevail on them), she asked to 
withdraw them and remand the remaining claims to state 
court. This tactic failed when the Court ruled that Boyer could 
not withdraw her claims so late in the game and thus retained 
jurisdiction over the entire case. It went on to grant summary 
23 
 
judgment to the UPenn defendants on all of Boyer’s claims 
because she failed to oppose any of their motions. 
Boyer argues the District Court abused its discretion 
by denying her request to withdraw her Price-Anderson 
negligence claims and by refusing to remand the remainder of 
her claims. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. 
  1. Motion to Withdraw 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 provides that a 
“plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by 
filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party 
serves either an answer or a motion for summary 
judgment[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (emphasis added). Boyer 
waited to withdraw her Price-Anderson claims until after 
UPenn had filed its answer. At that point, any dismissal could 
occur “only by court order[] on terms that the court considers 
proper.” Id.; accord Ferguson v. Eakle, 492 F.2d 26, 28 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (once an answer has been filed, whether to permit 
dismissal is left to the discretion of the District Court). 
 Of course, the District Court’s discretion is not without 
limit. It must consider “the presence or extent of any 
prejudice to the defendant by the draconian measure of 
dismissing [a] plaintiff’s complaint.” Ferguson, 492 F.2d at 
29. We have noted that “Rule 41 motions ‘should be allowed 
unless defendant will suffer some prejudice other than the 
mere prospect of a second lawsuit.’” In re Paoli R.R. Yard 
PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 863 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 5 J. 
Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 41.05[1], at 41–62 
(1988)). The record reflects that UPenn would indeed have 
suffered prejudice had the Price-Anderson negligence claims 
been withdrawn. 
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 The Magistrate Judge held that the Act applied to at 
least some of Boyer’s claims in May 2014, and the District 
Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation in 
full in December 2014. By the time Boyer filed her 
withdrawal motion a year later in December 2015, UPenn had 
produced five expert reports and thousands of pages of 
documents and had filed one of its four motions for summary 
judgment (the other three would follow the next month). 
 These facts are of a piece with Ferguson, 492 F.2d at 
29, which held that a District Court abused its discretion by 
granting withdrawal “[f]ourteen months after [the objecting 
parties] became defendants in one case and had gone to the 
expense of retaining counsel, six months after they had gone 
through pre-trial, and at least two months after they had 
expected that all discovery had been completed[.]” Were 
Boyer permitted to withdraw her claims without prejudice, 
UPenn would have faced the prospect of potentially 
relitigating, at some later date, claims it had put significant 
time and resources into defending and already litigated to the 
summary-judgment stage. Thus we have no doubt the District 
Court acted within its discretion when it denied Boyer’s 
motion. 
  2. Retention of Jurisdiction over Boyer’s  
   Remaining Claims 
 Boyer contends the District Court abused its discretion 
by retaining jurisdiction over her remaining claims of fraud, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, medical 
malpractice, and corporate negligence. We again disagree. 
 Per 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the District Court had authority 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law 
claims. Even had it permitted withdrawal of claims governed 
by the Price-Anderson Act, the Court would not have lost 
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jurisdiction to hear any state-law claims “that are so related to 
[the federal] claims . . . that they form[ed] part of the same 
case or controversy.” Id.; cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500, 513–14, (2006) (“[W]hen a court grants a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a federal claim, the court generally 
retains discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, 
pursuant to § 1367, over pendent state-law claims.”). And 
Boyer offers no argument that her state-law claims were not 
part of the same case or controversy as those governed by the 
Price-Anderson Act. We have explained that the decision to 
retain supplemental jurisdiction “should be based on 
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness 
to the litigants.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, 
the parties had already engaged in significant litigation before 
the District Court, so values of economy, convenience, and 
fairness all supported its retention of jurisdiction. We see no 
reason to second-guess it now.10 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The facts of Boyer’s action are tragic: her husband, a 
47-year-old researcher whose life’s work was studying the 
effects of radiation on biological organisms, died from a rare 
form of brain cancer. But as often happens in the law, this 
case provides us little opportunity to contemplate Ware’s 
                                              
10 The District Court held that its retention of jurisdiction was 
all the more appropriate because Boyer’s claims of fraud and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress were in fact federal 
claims governed by the Price-Anderson Act. Because we hold 
that the District Court properly exercised supplemental 
jurisdiction over Boyer’s “state-law” claims per § 1367, we 
do not reach this alternative jurisdictional ground. 
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suffering from his illness or his family’s suffering from his 
loss. Instead, our review is confined to bloodless questions of 
statutory interpretation and appropriate management of 
litigation. On these issues we find no fault with the District 
Court’s holdings. The Price-Anderson Act governed Boyer’s 
negligence claims, and the Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying her request to withdraw those claims and to 
remand her others. We thus affirm its judgment. 
